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Summary: The national identity clause has drawn signiﬁ cant atten-
tion lately and not without reason. Developments regarding this provi-
sion have given rise to concerns about whether Article 4(2) CTEU will 
have implications for the absolute primacy of EU law and thus its 
authority. This paper argues that Article 4(2) CTEU will play a valu-
able role in providing additional ground for further co-operation be-
tween national constitutional courts and the ECJ and provides the 
possibility for national constitutional courts in occasional situations to 
set aside EU law on constitutional identity grounds. This view is pre-
sented through a textual and contextual analysis of the provision, the 
attitudes of both national constitutional courts and the ECJ towards 
the issue, and lastly the theoretical framework of constitutional plural-
ism, particularly constitutionalism beyond the state. 
1 Introduction
Sovereignty, supremacy, direct effect and Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
have undoubtedly been buzzwords in European constitutional law and 
have represented the embodiment of the relationship between Europe-
an Union and national constitutional law.1 However, the latest develop-
ments in European integration have brought an additional phrase that 
will perhaps serve as a turning point. Namely, the clause on the respect 
for the national identities of the Member States in Article 4(2) of the 
Consolidated Treaty on European Union (CTEU) has drawn signiﬁ cant 
attention, particularly after the interpretations and reasoning delivered 
concerning this provision by several constitutional courts,2 both in the 
context of the Constitutional Treaty and also the Lisbon Treaty. That this 
*  PhD candidate, Faculty of Law at the University of Cologne, and Teaching Assistant of 
Constitutional Law and Political Systems at the Iustinianus Primus Faculty of Law at the 
University of Saints Cyril and Methodius, Skopje.
1  For more on this relationship, see I Pernice, N Walker, M Maduro, P Kirchof, A von 
Bogdandy, M Kumm and F Mayer.
2  France, Constitutional Council, Decision 2004-505 DC Treaty Establishing a Constitution 
for Europe; Spain, Constitutional Tribunal, Declaration on Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe, DTC 001/2004; Germany, Federal Constitutional Court, Lisbon Decision, 2 BvE 
2/08 of 30 June 2009.
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interest is not just a coincidence can be observed in the most recent case 
law of certain constitutional courts as well as the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (ECJ).
Be that as it may, and regardless of the expectations raised by the 
Constitutional Treaty and the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty, the conten-
tious debate on the relationship and conﬂ icts between European Union 
law and national constitutional law will certainly continue to play a role 
in the future. Any expectation that this debate in the European con-
stitutional realm is reaching an end is unfortunately wishful thinking. 
Nevertheless, a ‘harmless’ concretisation of a single provision, often ne-
glected in the past, has added a truly ‘new ﬂ avour’. Through the clause 
on national identity, national constitutions have received ﬁ rmer status 
and recognition in EU law.3 Some authors state that this is obvious evi-
dence of the openness of EU law towards national constitutions.4
This ‘new ﬂ avour’ is frequently perceived in recent dilemmas. Is na-
tional identity actually the same as constitutional identity in EU law? 
Who should deﬁ ne national identity? What is this provision’s impact on 
the primacy of EU law and the exercise of conferred powers by EU insti-
tutions? These and several other questions have come under discussion 
and this paper aims to tackle them. In short, it involves a critical analy-
sis of the statement that ‘interpretations of Article 4(2) TEU will become 
[are becoming] the battleground or the meeting point, where the limits of 
the authority of EU law lie’.5 It will be argued that the national identity 
clause provides an instrument for establishing a meeting point where 
the conﬂ icts arising out of this relationship could be mitigated, but not 
solved in each case, by taking into consideration both EU and national 
constitutional aspects of respect for national identity.
Following this line of reasoning, this article will discuss the back-
ground and textual and contextual dimensions of Article 4(2) CTEU as 
a starting point for the analysis, but also represents a supplementary 
argument in support of the thesis. It will be shown how even the tex-
tual and contextual interpretation of this provision requires a shift from 
a strictly conceived primacy of EU law. The interpretations of national 
identity of national constitutional courts and the ECJ will be dealt with, 
trying to show how constitutional courts have already established a link 
between national identity and constitutional identity, especially in the 
3  B De Witte, ‘The Lisbon Treaty and National Constitutions. More or Less Europeanisa-
tion?’ in C Closa (ed), The Lisbon Treaty and National Constitutions (ARENA 2009) 32.
4  A von Bogdandy and S Schill, ‘Die Achtung der nationale Identität unter dem refor-
mierten Unionsvertrag Zur unionsrechtlichen Rolle nationalen Verfassungsrechts und zur 
Überwindung des absolute Vorrangs’ (2010) ZaöRV Heft 4, 715.
5  D Chalmers, G Davies and G Monti, European Union Law: Cases and Materials, (2nd edn 
CUP 2010) 202.
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EU context, and how the invocation of Article 4(2), or the lack of it, by the 
ECJ and its practice in the realm of fundamental freedoms and rights 
creates certain dilemmas over the issue of national identity. Lastly, the 
question of how the national identity clause impacts on the principle of 
the primacy of EU law will be considered. It will be argued that a rigid 
understanding of the absolute primacy of EU law is incompatible with 
new developments seen through the prism of Article 4(2), which provides 
an additional argument in support of theories of constitutional pluralism 
and the claim of a constitutional heterarchy in Europe.
2  Article 4(2) CTEU: ‘harmless’ clariﬁ cation with the potential for 
a big impact?
2.1 Respect for national identities ex nihilo?
The national identity clause under Article 4(2) CTEU did not come 
out of nothing ex nihilo. The duty of European institutions to respect the 
national identities of Member States was introduced for the ﬁ rst time in 
the Maastricht Treaty (TM) through Article F(1).6 The reasons behind the 
enactment of this provision are often seen in the many substantial in-
novations that this Treaty brought to the then European Communities. 
In particular, these innovations were the creation of the European Union 
and treaty provisions touching upon issues traditionally part of national 
constitutions and sovereignty, such as Monetary Union, European citi-
zenship and the corpus of rights linked to it, and co-operation on for-
eign policy, justice and home affairs.7 This attempt to balance federalist 
tendencies at the European level and national sovereignty,8 or rather 
external limits to European integration,9 did not really occur as a result 
of this vaguely formulated provision. As a matter of fact, neither Article 
F(1) nor Article 6(3), after the renumbering occurred with the adoption 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam (TA), has been invoked by the ECJ,10 and the 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany has done this on only one oc-
6  ‘The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States, whose systems of 
government are founded on the principles of democracy’. Treaty on the European Union 
(Maastricht), OJ C191, 29.07.2011 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/
htm/11992M.html#0001000001> accessed 15 August 2012.
7  De Witte (n 3) 33.
8  J-H Reestman, ‘The Franco-German Constitutional Divide: Reﬂ ections in National and 
Constitutional Identity’ (2009) 5 European Constitutional Law Review 374, 376.
9  T Oppermann, Europarecht, (2nd edn CH Beck 1999) §11, para 885; T Oppermann, CD 
Classen and M Nettesheim, Europarecht, (4th edn CH Beck 2009) §5 para 8. Compare A von 
Bogdandy and S Schill, ‘Article 4 EUV’ in E Grabitz, M Hilf and M Ruffert (eds), Das Recht 
der Europäischen Union, Kommentar I (CH Beck 2011) para 38. 
10  LFM Besselink, ‘National and Constitutional Identity before and after Lisbon’ (2010) 6(3) 
Utrecht Law Review 41.
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casion.11 However, the need to counterweight federalist tendencies has 
not diminished among Member States.
During the deliberations on and drafting of the Treaty Establish-
ing a Constitution for Europe (CT) during the Constitutional Conven-
tion, the question of concretisation of the national identity clause was 
put on the table.12 It was afﬁ rmed that this provision should be made 
more transparent, clarifying the notion of national identity, although 
there was disagreement on how it should be done. The so-called ‘Christo-
phersen Clause’, which was an alternative to the ﬁ rmly rejected proposal 
of listing all the competences of Member States or creating a charter of 
Member States’ rights,13 served as the basis for the new Article I-5 of the 
CT. It regulated the relations between the Union and Member States, 
and in its ﬁ rst paragraph inter alia stipulated the duty to respect the 
national identities of Member States. A compromise was ﬁ nally reached 
by clarifying national identities in the provision through the fundamen-
tal structures inherent in their political and constitutional structures, 
including regional and local self-government, hence leaving out certain 
other proposed elements14 such as language, national citizenship, and 
church-state relations, which would be regulated by other provisions in 
the reformed TEU and TFEU after Lisbon.15 
The same provision was taken over by the Lisbon Treaty and an 
additional sentence emphasising national security as an essential state 
function was added. In the reform of the TEU, it was inserted as the 
second paragraph of Article 4, which also regulates relations between 
the Union and Member States, even though, due to the approach taken 
in the EU treaties, it does not bear this title as in the CT. However, some 
authors use a more EU-friendly title for this article in their contribu-
tions such as ‘principles of fundamental federal structure’ (Prinzipien der 
föderativen Grundstruktur),16 while others treat it as ‘a strong reafﬁ rma-
tion of the non-federal nature of the European Union’.17
11  Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Maastricht Treaty 1992 Constitutionality 
Case, 2 BvR 2134 and 2159/92 in A Oppenheimer, The Relationship Between European 
Community Law and National Law Vol 1 (CUP 1994) 556, 574.
12  For other aspects of the process, see A Puttler, ‘Article 4 EUV’ in C Calliess and M Ruffert 
(eds), EUV/AEUV Kommentar (4th edn CH Beck 2011) paras 5-7.
13  CONV 251/02, 3. One should be careful with this type of argument when claiming a 
certain type of meaning and scope of a relevant provision, as the context changes, especially 
in this case with the leaving out of the primacy clause in the Lisbon Treaty.
14  For more on the debate over these proposals, see CONV 357/02, 10-12 and CONV 
400/02, 13.
15  Article 3(3) CTEU on language; Article 20 TFEU on national citizenship. See Reestman 
(n 8) 381.
16  Von Bogdandy and Schill (n 9).
17  De Witte (n 3) 35.
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2.2  Textual and contextual analysis of the national identity 
clause (Article 4(2))
Like many other provisions in the treaties, Article 4 is a multifacet-
ed article that regulates relations between the Union and Member States. 
Consequently, besides the reafﬁ rmation of the principle of the conferral 
of powers or the limited powers of the EU in the ﬁ rst paragraph18 and 
the loyalty or ﬁ delity principle with regard to the accomplishment and 
achievement of Treaty tasks, obligations and objectives in the third, Ar-
ticle 4 reserves the second paragraph for the three duties prescribed for 
Union institutions. The latter are often seen as central to the interpreta-
tion of Article 4, particularly as far as the relationship between Union 
law and national constitutions is concerned. The three basic duties of 
Union institutions set out by Article 4(2) are respect for the equality of 
Member States before the Treaties,19 and respect for national identities 
and essential state functions.20
Focusing on the national identity clause, without underestimating 
the importance of the other principles set forth in this article, one has to 
see how the wording of this provision should be interpreted in the light 
of textual and contextual analysis. It is only after reﬂ ections on how this 
provision could and should be interpreted that one can turn to the recent 
case law of both constitutional courts and the ECJ.
2.2.1 The meaning and scope of the national identity clause: a textual 
analysis
The need for concretisation of the national identity clause proved to 
be necessary because of the vagueness and ambiguity of national iden-
tity as a notion in terms of its understanding under Article F(1) TM and 
later Article 6(3) TA.21 Just as the components of this notion, namely 
‘nation’ and ‘identity’, elude attempts to delimit them from other notions 
18  Article 4(1) refers to Article 5, where the conferral of power principle is basically regu-
lated, and restates the last sentence of Paragraph two. See J-C Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: A 
Legal and Political Analysis (CUP 2010) 84. See also CONV 375/02 in the context of the CT 
referring to the objective of Article I-5: ‘The article would therefore not constitute a deﬁ nition 
of Member State competence, thereby wrongly conveying the message that it is the Union 
that grants competence to the Member States, or that Union action may never impact on 
these ﬁ elds’.
19  G Amato and J Ziller, The European Constitution (Edward Elgar 2007) 108: ‘This refer-
ence did not add anything new to the Union’s institutional arrangements, though it did 
underscore the need to avoid an asymmetrical federalism. The deﬁ nitive version of Article 
I-5 loses in elegance that which it gains in precision’. Compare Federal Constitutional Court 
of Germany, Lisbon decision, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009 para 292, and also Piris (n 18) 
85-86.
20  Von Bogdandy and Schill (n 4).709. 
21  CONV 375/1/02 REV 1, 10.
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and precisely deﬁ ne them,22 the same is true with the amorphous notion 
of national identity, which has practically made this provision obsolete. 
According to Reestman, ‘[under the] most common reading of national 
identity it is very hard, if not impossible to deﬁ ne with any measure of 
objectivity what the Union’s duty to respect the national identity of its 
Member States entails.’23 It ‘fans out in all directions’ but least of all to-
wards any relation to constitutional structures.24 This common reading 
he refers to is more often associated with the social, cultural, political 
and even psychological aspects of national identity than with the legal 
comprehension of this notion.25 Due to its broadness and generality, it 
has served more as a political declaration than as a legal provision pro-
ducing legal effect.
An additional problem with the wording of Article 6(3) was the use 
of the plural form of national identities in the English version,26 which 
might be equated more easily with the existence of multinational iden-
tities in countries rich in ethnic, religious or linguistic diversity. Thus, 
under such a construction, it was possible without further clariﬁ cation 
of the notion of national identity, for cultural,27 historical, political and 
other identities to be subsumed28 within the provision. This would have 
opened the door to a situation where every national particularity and 
characteristic could have served as a reason for limitation on the exer-
cise of Union powers.29
Therefore, the new Article 4(2) CTEU states that the national identi-
ties of Member States are inherent in their fundamental constitutional 
22  For more on the problem of deﬁ ning identity and nation by providing explanations of the 
synchronic and disynchronic aspects of identity as well as the objective, both pre-state and 
state, and subjective elements of ‘nation’, see Reestman (n 8) 374-379 and von Bogdandy 
and Schill (n 4) 711-13.
23  Reestman (n 8) 380.
24  Reestman (n 8) 379, 376.
25  H von der Groeben and J Schwarze (eds), Vertrag über die Europäische Union und Vertrag 
zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Band 1 Art 1-53 EUV (6th edn Nomos 2003). 
Para 201 states ‘Nationale Identität bedeutet aber auch mehr als Verfassungsidentität. 
Über diese Mehr entscheidet der Mitgliedstaat selbst. Als Beispiel werden in diesen Zusam-
menhang Sport, Kultur und Bildung aber auch die interne Staatsorganisation, die Fami-
lienstrukturen und die sozialen Sicherungssysteme’. Von Bogdandy and Schill (n 4) 712, 
citing Flaggenbeschimpfungs-Beschluss, ‘Nationale Identität meint dann gleichgerichtete 
psychische Vorgänge der Staatsbürger’.
26  The German version uses ‘nationale Identität’ in the singular form. 
27  See C Strumpf ‘Article 6’ in J Schwarze (ed), EU-Kommentar (Nomos 2nd edn 2008) para 
39. In the context of the working languages of EU Institutions, see Oppermann, Classen 
and Nettesheim (n 9) § 6 para 18. 
28  A Puttler ‘Article 6’ in C Callies and M Ruffert (eds), Kommentar zu EU-Vertrag und EG-
Vertrag (2nd edn CH Beck 2002) para 213; Oppermann (n 9) § 11 para 885.
29  Besselink (n 10) 42-43.
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and political structures, inclusive of regional and local self-government.30 
In this sense, Article 4(2) CTEU has its basis in Article 6(3) TA and rep-
resents the clariﬁ cation and concretisation and not the alteration of this 
provision. The emphasis on fundamental constitutional structures basi-
cally ties national identity ﬁ rmly to constitutional identity and excludes 
cultural and other types of identity from the scope of this provision.31 
The English version makes the case for this conclusion more strongly 
by using inherent instead of ﬁ nds its expression through (zum Ausdruck 
kommt) in establishing the link between national identity and consti-
tutional structures.32 It is only the fundamental values, the core of the 
constitutional identity, that are to be respected, and in this way a pre-
constitutional context and argument is avoided, something that might be 
implied by the latter expression. If the opposite was the case, every single 
issue could be connected to national identity. Such an understanding 
is also supported by the existence of a separate provision, Article 3(3) 
CTEU, which regulates respect for cultural and linguistic diversity33 and 
creates a duty for the Union itself, unlike Article 149(1) TEC, where such 
a duty of respect did not exist.34 
Additionally, it is very important to determine the extent of the duty 
that is placed on EU institutions. Therefore, the notion of ‘respect’ should 
be examined. It is quite certain that this respect represents a legal ob-
ligation for the Union.35 According to von Bogdandy, the duty to respect 
national identity in Article 4(2) does not in any way imply an absolute 
protection or preservation of national identity,36 and accordingly does not 
imply the primacy of constitutional provisions regulating speciﬁ c values 
30  ‘The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as 
their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitu-
tional, inclusive of regional and local self-government.’ CTEU <http://register.consilium.
europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st06/st06655.en08.pdf> accessed 10 August 2012.
31  Puttler (n 28) para 14; von Bogdandy and Schill (n 16) para 14; Besselink (n 10) 44. 
Compare R Geiger, ‘Article 4 EUV’ para 3 in R Geiger, D-E Khan and M Kotzur (eds), EUV/
AEUV (5th edn CH Beck 2010).
32  A von Bogdandy and S Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Iden-
tity under the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) 48 CLM Rev, 1427-1428; von Bogdandy and Schill (n 
16) para 14.
33  For the secondary role of cultural identity under Article 4(2) CTEU, see Besselink (n 10) 
44.
34  ‘[R]especting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the 
organization of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity’, Art 149 TEC. 
See also Case C-160/03 Kingdom of Spain v Eurojust [2005] ECR I-2077, Opinion of AG 
Maduro, para 24. He refers to both Article 6 TEU and 149 TEC, thus showing that both of 
these articles regulate linguistic identity, ie diversity.
35  Opinion of AG Maduro (n 34) para 33; Puttler (n 12) para 22.
36  Compare Beutler ‘Article 6’ in von der Groeben and Schwarze (eds) (n 25) para 201: ‘Sie 
[Die Achtung] nicht nur Respektierung, sondern vor allem auch Förderung der jeweiligen 
nationalen Identität’.
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over EU law as a matter of principle.37 Nevertheless, he states that it cer-
tainly represents a legal obligation for the Union. It envisages the need 
for balance under circumstances of conﬂ ict between the fundamental 
principles and values of the two legal orders and co-operation between 
the institutions of these orders.38 The way this balance is to be reached 
and co-operation achieved is, on the other hand, a matter of contention. 
Whether this is to be achieved through judicial means where either the 
ECJ or national constitutional courts will have the last word, each in its 
own realm, or whether it should be left to the political institutions, main-
ly at the national level, to decide upon is open for discussion. In contrast, 
Puttler argues that in the case of conﬂ ict between the national identity of 
Member States and the exercise of Union competences, the latter should 
yield. She thus argues that there is no room for any balancing and that 
the national identity clause can be invoked only in extreme situations.39 
As this relationship is one of the core issues raised with regard to the re-
lationship between EU law and national law, it will be dealt with in more 
detail in the last part of this paper.
At the end of this section, two other points should be addressed 
as far as the wording of Article 4(2) is concerned. The ﬁ rst point worth 
making is the referral to ‘fundamental constitutional structures’ instead 
of constitutional values in the national identity clause. Here, a narrow 
reading40 of this provision might be possible due to the common under-
standing of the term structures, which is often related to the organisa-
tion and institutional design of the respective state whilst not including 
constitutional and political values.41 Even though it is true that these 
notions are not synonymous, which might lead to debate over the scope 
of the provision, there is almost a tacit consensus among scholars that 
constitutional values come within the meaning of the national identity 
clause.42 The same understanding is present in the decisions of both na-
tional constitutional courts and the ECJ.
In addition, as far as Article 4(2) is concerned, emphasis is most 
frequently put on fundamental constitutional structures, assuming a 
national dimension while somehow forgetting the second part concern-
ing the clariﬁ cation of national identity. Namely, regional and local self-
government in the Member States, which were not covered under Article 
37  Von Bogdandy and Schill (n 16) para 33.
38  Von Bogdandy and Schill (n 4) 726, 731.
39  Puttler (n 12) para 22.
40  Compare Joined Cases C-428/06 to C-434/06 Unión General de Trabajadores de La 
Rioja (UGT-Rioja) v Juntas Generales del Territorio Histórico de Vizcaya and Others [2008] 
ECR I-6747, Opinion of AG Kokott, para 54.
41  De Witte (n 3) 34.
42  Von Bogdandy and Schill (n 16) para 28; Puttler (n 12) para 16.
275CYELP 8 [2012] 267-298
6(3) TA,43 are recognised and included as part of the fundamental consti-
tutional structures which they are normally part of as clariﬁ cation of the 
national identity of Member States.44 Now, they not only fall within the 
scope of Article 4(2) but they, or to be more precise the Committee of the 
Regions, have been given the right to ﬁ le actions for infringements of the 
subsidiarity principle by legislative acts of the Union before the ECJ un-
der Article 263(3). Thus, the duty to respect regional and local structures 
is even more concrete on the side of the Union, bearing in mind that it 
has been reinforced by the inclusion of these structures within the sub-
sidiarity principle.45 This does not alter the fact that regional and local 
authorities are only indirectly tied to national identity, that is, through 
the Member States and their constitutions in the light of EU law.46 This 
implies that certain speciﬁ cities at regional and local level might not be 
incorporated within the scope of the provision.
2.2.2 Article 4(2) and other Treaty provisions
It is ﬁ rmly established within the methods of legal interpretation 
that a provision cannot be analysed in isolation without any relation to 
other relevant provisions. This is even more so when complex legal texts 
are concerned, such as the EU Treaties. Therefore, Article 4(2) must be 
read, ﬁ rst of all, in the context of Article 4 as a whole, and then in rela-
tion to other relevant articles such as Articles 2, 5, 7 and 3(3) TEU.
The national identity clause, when viewed in the light of the confer-
ral of powers principle (Article 4(1) and Article 5(1) and (2) CTEU) in con-
junction with the principles of subsidiarity47 and proportionality 48(Article 
5(3) and (4)) and the ﬁ delity clause (Article 4(3)), should be understood as 
representing the limits on the exercise of the EU’s powers conferred on it 
by the Member States. As a matter of fact, even Article 6(3) TA has been 
understood by some authors in the same way, regardless of the position-
ing and usage of this provision prior to the Lisbon Treaty.49 Union insti-
tutions have a duty to respect the national identity inferred in the phrase 
43  Puttler (n 28) para 216. See also Beutler (n 36) para 204, focusing on regional self-gov-
ernment.
44  Amato and Ziller (n 19) 81; Case C-324/07 Coditel Brabant SPRL v Commune d’Uccle and 
Région de Bruxelles-Capital [2008] ECR I- 8457, Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para 85.
45  Amato and Ziller (n 19) 190.
46  This is best illustrated by the fact that local self-government is not part of the Ger-
man constitutional identity embodied in Article 79(3), while regional self-government is. See 
Puttler (n 12) para 19.
47  See Beutler (n 25) para.205 and Strumpf (n 27) para 38 in the context of Article 6(3) TA. 
48  Von Bogdandy and Schill, (n 16) para 33, put the emphasis on proportionality and do 
not refer to subsidiarity, while Puttler refers to both (n 12) para 10.
49  Beutler (n 25) para 206.
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‘full mutual respect’ and should not take actions that could jeopardise 
the fundamental political and constitutional structures of the Member 
States, which is implied by Article 4(3) CTEU subparagraph 1.50 Such a 
reading is also justiﬁ ed by the positioning of the national identity clause 
in Paragraph 2 before the ﬁ delity principle, which is regulated in Para-
graph 3 of Article 4. A different reading of this relationship would make 
the national identity clause redundant. Thus, it can be inferred that the 
Treaty in this way qualiﬁ es the ﬁ delity principle through the protection 
of the national identities of the Member States.51
In addition, the reason for the ﬁ rst paragraph being inserted in Ar-
ticle 4, which emphasises the residual powers of the Member States, and 
also the ordering of the paragraphs in this article could be interpreted as 
having the intention of showing that the external limit on the exercise of 
the Union’s conferred powers are the fundamental constitutional struc-
tures of the Member States. This is also why the delimitation of powers 
between the Union and the Member States was discussed together with 
Article I-5 during the Constitutional Convention.52
On the other hand, limitation on the exercise of the conferred pow-
ers of the Union cannot run counter to the values of the EU listed in 
Article 2 TEU, which are basically common to the Member States and 
serve as the main condition under Article 49 for membership of the EU.53 
If the interpretation of national identity runs counter to the basic values 
of the EU, then action on the suspension of voting rights under Article 7 
TEU could be taken.54 This position opens the door for the ECJ to assess 
national identity in the light of EU law, ie the values set out in the TEU, 
which has not been enthusiastically welcomed by national constitutional 
courts. However, the interpretation suggested here is one that envisions 
control over the outer limit of EU law, ie Article 2 CTEU, as in the op-
posite case the ECJ would be projecting EU values, interpreted by the 
Court itself, on national identity and in essence asserting the absolute 
primacy of EU law as declared in established case law.
The abstract textual and contextual argumentation connected to 
the interpretation and understanding of the national identity clause is 
made more tangible with an examination of the case law of national 
constitutional courts and the ECJ in the next section. Despite being tan-
50  ‘Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States 
shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which ﬂ ow from the 
Treaties’ (emphasis added).
51  Puttler (n 12) para 10.
52  Puttler (n 12) para 14.
53  In the context of Article 6(1) and (3) TA, see Beutler (n 25) para 205. 
54  Von Bogdandy and Schill (n 4) 715. See also Puttler (n 28) para 218.
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gible, they nevertheless remain complex and without a ﬁ rm conclusion 
concerning their future impact.
3  The national identity clause in the case law of national 
constitutional courts and the ECJ 
In the previous section, Article 4(2) was discussed through a textual 
and contextual analysis which sheds some light on the whole issue, thus 
making such arguments only supplementary, but which does not answer 
certain very important questions. Namely, who is to decide upon the 
content of national identity, and who is to monitor the conformity of EU 
legislative acts and actions with national identity? The answers to these 
questions show that in essence there is an inherent need placed within 
the framework of this provision for co-operation between the two legal 
orders, represented by the highest judicial instances, in order for this 
provision to play a constructive role. However, there seem to be certain 
limits on the achievement of this co-operation. 
3.1  The deﬁ nition of national identity in national constitutional 
court case law55
3.1.1 National identity as constitutional identity 
It has been ﬁ rmly established that constitutional courts are best 
placed to deﬁ ne the content of national identity as referred to in Article 
4(2) CTEU.56 Only these institutions can authoritatively determine the 
true meaning and scope of the relevant constitutional provisions regu-
lating the fundamental values and principles of constitutional identity. 
Accordingly, as the establishment of the meaning and scope of national 
identity would involve the interpretation of national law, the ECJ under 
Article 19 CTEU lacks the jurisdiction to rule upon such cases. It is cer-
tain, though, that the latter cannot be perceived in absolute terms, as 
the application of the national identity clause has its own limits within 
EU law as seen in Article 2 TEU.
Even though almost every European constitution contains a provi-
sion that declares, regulates or at least alludes to the core elements of 
constitutional identity, the association of national identity in the sense of 
55  The focus here is on constitutional courts due to concern for the length of the paper. 
There is also the respective case law of high courts with constitutional jurisdiction in other 
Member States, which should not be underestimated and which should be taken into con-
sideration, eg Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, etc.
56  Case C-213/07, Michaniki AE v Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis [2008] ECR I-9999 
Opinion of AG Maduro, para 30; Case C-53/04, Cristiano Marrosu and Gianluca Sardino v 
Aziedna Ospidaliera Ospedale [2006] ECR I-7213, Opinion of AG Maduro, para 40. See also 
von Bogdandy and Schill (n 4).
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Article 4(2) CTEU with these provisions has been a recent development. 
As a matter of fact, it has only been the Federal Constitutional Court 
of Germany (FCC) that has so far directly established a link between 
the national identity clause and constitutional identity as envisaged in 
Article 79(3) of the German Basic Law (GG). Other constitutional courts 
either have not had the opportunity to establish this link or have missed 
the ﬁ rst opportunity to do so. 
Be that as it may, one should not draw the wrong conclusion that 
constitutional identity has not played a substantial role in cases involv-
ing both primary and secondary EU law. The notion of national or con-
stitutional identity is not alien to national constitutional courts in cases 
dealing with EU law. In the past, they invoked constitutional provisions 
that expressed the core values of constitutional identity in order to re-
sist, in a more abstract and preventive manner, the excessive exercise of 
Union competences and the absolute primacy of EC/EU law.
Like every other discussion on the relationship between national 
constitutions and EU law, one has to begin with the already well-known 
case law of the constitutional courts of Germany and Italy, which some 
authors claim have shaped the national identity clause.57
In the early 1970s, the FCC started writing the ﬁ rst concrete chapter 
on the relationship between national constitutional and EU law, which 
signiﬁ cantly inﬂ uenced the future development of this never-ending sto-
ry. In Solnage I, the Court reasoned that ‘it [Article 24 GG] does not open 
the way to amending the basic structure of the Basic Law, which forms 
the basis of its identity, without a formal amendment to the Basic Law, 
that is, it does not open any such way through legislation of the inter-
state institution.’58
This view has been afﬁ rmed and furthered along the line in the 
subsequent case law, in the ﬁ rst place by Solange II59 and the Maastricht 
Decision, which referred to Article F(1) of the Treaty of Maastricht in 
the context of subsidiarity, proportionality and the conferral of powers.60 
Most signiﬁ cantly, the value of constitutional identity in the light of Ar-
57  Reestman (n 8) 380.
58  Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Solange I, 2 BvL 52/71 of 29 May 1974, Deci-
sions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, Federal Republic of Germany: International Law and 
Law of the European Communities 1952-1989, 275.
59  Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Solange II, 2 BvR 197/83 of 22 October 1986, 
Decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, Federal Republic of Germany: International Law 
and Law of the European Communities 1952-1989, 625. 
60  Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Maastricht Treaty 1992 Constitutionality Case, 
2 BvR 2134 and 2159/92, in Oppenheimer (n 11) 556, 574. For more on these three cases, 
see FC Mayer, ‘The European Constitution and the Courts’, in A Von Bogdandy and J Bast 
(eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart 2006) 295-300.
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ticle 4(2) TEU has been emphasised and contextualised in the Lisbon 
decision. 
The Italian Constitutional Court (ICC), at almost the same time, 
formed its counter-limits (controlimiti) doctrine, which puts limits on the 
primacy of EU law by implying constitutional identity. In the Frontini 
case,61 the ICC made clear that EC powers or the exercise thereof could 
not in any case ‘violate [the] fundamental principles of our [Italian] con-
stitutional order or the inalienable rights of man’. In the case of viola-
tion, which according to this court is quite unlikely to occur, the ICC 
has the competence to review the acts or actions of EU institutions. The 
ICC has afﬁ rmed this standard in two other landmark cases, Granital62 
and Fragd,63 but to date has neither precisely deﬁ ned what this abstract 
formulation stands for nor which principles and values it entails, and 
neither has it applied it to EU law. 
The French Constitutional Council (CC) has also been busy in recent 
years on this issue. Its initial wording of ‘an express contrary provision 
of the Constitution’ that would justify disobedience towards a secondary 
EC law,64 was changed to a ‘rule or principle inherent to the constitu-
tional identity of France, except when the constituting power consents 
thereto [to the application of the EU act]’65 as a limit on the application 
of the same source of law. However, the idea behind it remains the same, 
embodied in the doctrine of réserve de constitutionnalité, ie the accep-
tance of the primacy of EU law within certain constitutional limits.66
Nevertheless, the decisions of the CC and the Spanish Constitu-
tional Tribunal (SCT), where views were shared between the two insti-
tutions on the meaning of the then Article I-5 CT with regard to Article 
61  ICC, Frontini v Ministero delle Finanze of 27 December 1973, in Oppenheimer (n 11) 
640. 
62  ICC, Spa Granital v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato of 8 June 1984, in Op-
penheimer (n 11) 651.
63  ICC, Fragd v Amministrazione delle Finanze of 21 April 1989, in Oppenheimer (n 11) 
657.
64  When the constitutionality of primary law is at stake, then the phrase used by the 
Council that represents its standard of control in the process of ratiﬁ cation, is for the com-
mitments taken by the treaties not to ‘call into question constitutionally guaranteed rights 
and freedoms or adversely affect the fundamental conditions of the exercising of national 
sovereignty’. See French Constitutional Council Decision No 2004-505 DC of 19 November 
2004, para 7 and also Decision No 2007-560 DC of 20 December 2007, para 9.
65  For more on the provisions which are speciﬁ c to France and thus part of its constitu-
tional identity, see Reestman (n 8 ), 388. Here, a note should be made on a possible area of 
conﬂ ict regarding the policy, or better said lack of any, on respect and recognition of racial 
and ethnic minorities in France and the values of the Union envisaged in Article 2 CTEU, 
which also includes respect for the rights of persons belonging to minorities. 
66  X Groussot, ‘Supr[i]macy à la Française: Another French Exception?’ (2008) 27 Yearbook 
on European Law, 89, 105-107.
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I-6 CT, the primacy clause, are crucial for the greater awareness and 
signiﬁ cance of the national identity clause not only in France and Spain 
but also beyond. It was stated that the relation and positioning of the two 
provisions is a clear sign that national identity represents the limit to the 
primacy of EU law over national constitutions, and this is why they did 
not ﬁ nd the primacy clause to be in conﬂ ict with the constitution, since 
it did not alter the scope of the already existing doctrine.67 
Since 2004, on the other hand, the pattern created by the FCC and 
ICC, and now cautiously applied by the CC, has been followed by the 
other constitutional courts of the new Member States, which has led 
Sadurski to name this trend ‘Solange Chapter 3’.68 However, this trend 
has been characterised by an interesting and noteworthy paradox. While 
in the period prior to accession to the EU these states put a lot of effort 
into promoting the integration process as the only path for their further 
democratisation, after accession they have set limits on EU law rooted in 
constitutional provisions declaring the democratic character of the state 
based on the rule of law.69 
The Czech Constitutional Court (CCC) is an interesting example 
when it comes to discussing the national identity clause. Following an 
already settled case law, beginning with the Sugar Quota case,70 the 
CCC’s ﬁ rst decision dealing with EU matters in which the threshold was 
set, the CCC in its Lisbon I decision stated that the application of Union 
law in the Czech Republic has its limits in the ‘untouchable’ material 
core of the constitution. The material core stems from the principles of 
the ‘democratic state governed by the rule of law’ of Articles 9(2) and 
1(1) of the Constitution.71 In the follow-up to this decision, Lisbon II, it 
resisted pressure from applicants and ﬁ rmly declined to list the non-
transferable competences72 or declare the elements of the material core 
of the constitution,73 which belies the idea of a fundamental resemblance 
67  French Constitutional Council, Decision 2004-505 DC Treaty Establishing a Constitution 
for Europe, paras 12-13; Spanish Constitutional Tribunal, Declaration on Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, DTC 001/2004, para 4.
68  W Sadurski, ‘Solange, Chapter 3: Constitutional Courts in Central Europe - Democracy 
- European Union’ 14(1) European Law Journal 1.
69  Sadurski (n 68) 4; Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment K 18/04 of 11 May 2005; 
Hungarian Constitutional Court, Decision 17/2004 (V 25); Latvian Constitutional Court, 
Case no 2008-35-01 of 7 April 2009.
70  CCC, Decision PL US 50/04 of 8 March 2006. 
71  CCC, Treaty of Lisbon I, Decision PL US 19/08 of 26 November 2008, paras 85, 89, 94, 
91, 93, 114.
72  CCC, Treaty of Lisbon II, Decision PL. US 29/09, para 111. 
73  CCC (n 72) para 112.
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to the FCC’s case law.74 The logic behind the reasoning appears to be 
very sound and legitimate. The approach taken was to avoid the severe 
criticism that the FCC has received for its judicial activism in the Lisbon 
decision and inter alia for going too far with the deﬁ nition and scope of 
constitutional identity and essential state functions. Therefore, the CCC 
justiﬁ ed this move by stating that if it had decided differently, it would 
have crossed the line of its competences and in that way encroached 
upon the decision-making powers of political bodies, because of which it 
would have unavoidably been labelled an activist court.75
The general overview of national constitutional court case law shows 
a relatively high level of convergence as far as Article 4(2) CTEU is con-
cerned. However, a common understanding of the notion of constitu-
tional identity is not very likely, regardless of the values and principles 
shared by these states and which are also inherent to the EU. Notwith-
standing the absence in most cases of a direct referral and invocation of 
the national identity clause, the wording used by courts still seems to 
be in line with the national identity clause. Nevertheless, these institu-
tions have left open the precise determination of the content of national 
or constitutional identity by using general and abstract formulations, 
frequently citing only the relevant constitutional provisions and in this 
sense providing themselves with a certain leeway in future cases.
3.1.2 The Lisbon decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany
There are two main reasons why the Lisbon decision of the FCC is 
discussed separately from the case law of other national constitutional 
courts. First, the importance of this decision is undoubted as far as 
Article 4(2) CTEU is concerned. Second, there is the overall inﬂ uence 
and importance of this institution in shaping the relationship between 
national constitutional and EU law.
Adhering and further developing the principles introduced in its 
previous decisions, the FCC in its Lisbon decision76 clariﬁ ed and con-
textualised the constitutional identity of Germany at both the consti-
tutional and European level. Respecting the aforementioned continuity, 
the Court identiﬁ ed constitutional identity through Article 23(1) GG77 in 
74  See The Editors and J Komarek, ‘The Czech Constitutional Court’s Second Decision on the 
Lisbon Treaty of 3 November 2009’, (2009) 5 European Constitutional Law Review 345.
75  CCC (n 72). para. 113.
76  Federal Constitutional Court, Lisbon Decision, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009.
77  ‘With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall 
participate in the development of [a] European Union that is committed to democratic, so-
cial, and federal principles, to the rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that 
guarantees a level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by 
this Basic Law’.
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conjunction with Article 79(3) GG,78 the so-called ‘eternity clause’, and 
accordingly its duty to protect and guarantee this identity, the ‘identity 
review’, hence adding a new avenue for a review of EU law. For this sup-
plementation of the previous Solange and ultra vires review doctrines,79 
it ﬁ nds support not only in the GG but also in the CTEU, or more pre-
cisely Article 4(2), therefore concluding the mutuality of the obligation 
under both legal orders, which at the same time is in conformity with 
the principle of the openness of German law towards EU law and the loy-
alty clause.80 Through this reasoning, the FCC established a direct link 
between the constitutional identity of Germany and the national identity 
clause in the CTEU.
However, it did not stop here but went further, discussing which 
competences and powers of the German state cannot be transferred to 
the Union under existing constitutional provisions, a point which led 
some scholars81 to conclude that the notion of constitutional identity 
also includes certain other competences of the state enumerated in the 
Lisbon decision.82 On the other hand, the authors that noticed this is-
sue criticised the Court’s stance as being too far-reaching.83 Indeed, it 
is undeniably true that it is far-reaching, but only if it is read in such a 
way that directly relates the list of competences to constitutional iden-
tity as regulated in the Treaty. An alternative reading of the decision in 
78  Compare C Tomuschat, ‘Lisbon - Terminal of the European Integration Process? The 
Judgment of the German Constitutional Court of 30 June 2009’ (2010) ZaöRV Heft 2, 278, 
in which it is claimed that this provision has the aim of preventing anti-democratic forces 
taking power.
79  See J Ziller, ‘The German Constitutional Court’s Friendliness towards European Law: 
On the Judgment of Bundesverfassungsgericht over the Ratiﬁ cation of the Treaty of Lisbon’ 
(2010) 16(1) European Public Law 66-67.
80  FCC (n 76) para 240 ‘In this respect, the guarantee of national constitutional identity 
under constitutional and under Union law go hand in hand in the European legal area’ and 
para 235 ‘The obligation under European law to respect the constituent power of the Mem-
ber States as the masters of the Treaties corresponds to the non-transferable identity of the 
constitution (Article 79.3 of the Basic Law), which is not open to integration in this respect. 
Within the boundaries of its competences, the Federal Constitutional Court must review, 
where necessary, whether these principles are adhered to’. 
81  Geiger (n 31) links constitutional identity with the powers enumerated in FCC (n 76) 
para 260. Also see Puttler (n 12) para 17.
82  FCC (n 76) para 252 ‘Particularly sensitive for the ability of a constitutional state to 
democratically shape itself are decisions on substantive and formal criminal law (1), on the 
disposition of the monopoly on the use of force by the police within the state and by the 
military towards the exterior (2), fundamental ﬁ scal decisions on public revenue and public 
expenditure, the latter being particularly motivated, inter alia, by social policy considera-
tions (3), decisions on the shaping of living conditions in a social state (4) and decisions of 
particular cultural importance, for example on family law, the school and education system 
and on dealing with religious communities (5).’ See paras 253-260 where the court sepa-
rately explains these ﬁ ve groups of decisions. 
83  Von Bogdandy and Schill (n 4) 724.
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this part seems to be more reasonable. Challenging the aforementioned 
interpretation of the FCC’s reasoning, Reestman writes that the ﬁ ve do-
mains of state power ‘are, moreover, domains in which the chances of 
an encroachment of other principles belonging to the German constitu-
tional identity seem particularly great’ and ‘they are closely connected 
to it [constitutional identity] via the principle of democracy’.84 It is also 
afﬁ rmed by Grimm that ‘the list fulﬁ ls the function of [a] warning sign: 
touching these matters implies a danger to the identity of the Member 
States’ (emphasis added).85 This view corresponds to the one expressed 
by the CCC in the Lisbon II decision, where it demarcated non-transfer-
able competences from the elements of the material core,86 and can also 
be traced in the wording of the FCC. Even though these competences 
are related to the democratic principle, by using the wording ‘particu-
larly sensitive for the ability of a constitutional state to democratically 
shape itself’, it does not ﬁ rmly establish them as an inherent part of the 
constitutional identity and in the light of Article 4(2) CTEU, they cannot 
be seen in every case as fundamental constitutional structures. It is in 
this sense that one also has to bear in mind the third duty regulated by 
Article 4(2), ie the duty to respect essential state functions in support 
of this interpretation.87 A relationship to the national identity clause is 
present. However, it does not mean that these two duties of the Union are 
identical. Essential state functions do not have to be in every case part 
of the fundamental constitutional structures of the Member States. This 
is even more so when one notices that the Court states that ‘principle 
of democracy ... does not mean that a pre-determined number or cer-
tain types of sovereign rights should remain in the hands of the state’.88 
That such a reading of the Lisbon decision is not just an isolated case 
is shown by two other cases dealing with EU matters that followed this 
decision. Honeywell and Data Retention showed the FCC’s restraint and 
narrow application of the principles introduced or restated in the Lisbon 
decision.89  
84  Reestman (n 8) 386.
85  D Grimm, ‘Defending Sovereign Statehood against Transforming the European Union 
into a State’ (2009) 5 European Constitutional Law Review 368.
86  See Lisbon II paras 111 and 112. The second paragraph begins with the words ‘[f]or the 
same reason’.
87  Geiger (n 31) Art 4 EUV, para 4 referring to FCC, Lisbon (n 76) para 351 and the way the 
new EU powers should be exercised in future.
88  FCC, Lisbon (n 76) para 248. See also Grimm (n 85) 368.
89  FCC, Honeywell decision, 2 BvR 2661/06 of 6 July 2010 para 65. See M Mahlmann, 
‘The Politics of Constitutional Identity and its Legal Frame - the Ultra Vires Decision of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court’ (2010) 11 German Law Journal 1407, 1410. Data 
Retention decision 1BvR 256/08, 1BvR 263/08, 1 BvR 586/08 of 2 March 2010. See A-B 
Kaiser, Case Note: ‘German Data Retention Provisions Unconstitutional in their Present 
Form; Decision of 2 March 2010, NJW 2010’ (2010) 6 European Constitutional Law Review 
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Therefore, the FCC’s case law, especially the Lisbon decision, under 
this interpretation might also be seen as part of a general tendency of 
national constitutional courts. The question that remains open is how far 
the FCC and other courts are willing and able to go, both in the light of 
their international obligations assumed through the EU treaties, which 
will also be reviewed by the ECJ, and their respective constitutional pro-
visions. It appears to be evident from the number of cases that involve 
direct confrontation with EU law and the ECJ, and by the reasoning in 
the cases that a certain level of self-restraint is surely being applied. 
3.2 The ECJ and the national identity clause
Perhaps Article 19 CTEU does not provide jurisdiction for the ECJ 
to determine the content of a speciﬁ c national identity that is based pri-
marily on the constitutional provisions of the Member States, but a total 
exclusion of any type of jurisdiction over issues connected with the na-
tional identity clause would be implausible.90 In exercising its powers, the 
Court has to conﬁ rm that the respective structures of national identity do 
not infringe upon the values of the Union set forth in Article 2 CTEU. Ac-
cordingly, the relationship between the highest court instances of the two 
legal orders stemming from Article 4(2) CTEU is often characterised as a 
‘relationship of co-operation’.91 However, there is a dilemma about how this 
co-operation is to be realised under the present circumstances of friction 
and contradictory positions between the respective institutions.
3.2.1 The case law in the pre-Lisbon period
The ECJ’s case law does not have an impressive direct invocation of 
the national identity clause prior to the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty. 
National identity played only a secondary role. There is not a single judge-
ment of the ECJ where the Court drew attention to the duty of Union or-
gans to respect national identity as articulated ﬁ rst in Article 6(3) TEU. 
In cases where Advocate Generals had previously invoked these provi-
sions, the Court did not ﬁ nd it necessary to do the same.92 However, the 
503. In Honeywell, the FCC substantially qualiﬁ ed the scope of the ultra vires review, thus 
avoiding identity control. In Data Retention, it did not go too far on constitutional identity 
and identity control even though one might argue that there were strong grounds to do so 
or use an ultra vires review. 
90  Besselink (n 10) 45; von Bogdandy and Schill (n 4).707.
91  Besselink (n 10) 45, borrowing the wording of the FCC from the Maastricht decision (n 
59). See more on this point in P Kirchhof, ‘The Balance of Powers between National and 
European Institutions’ (1999) 5(3) European Law Journal 225.
92  Michaniki (n 56) Opinion of AG Maduro, para 30; Marrosu, Opinion of AG Maduro (n 56) 
para 40; UGT-Rioja (n 40) Opinion of AG Kokott, para 54; Kingdom of Spain v Eurojust (n 34) 
Opinion of AG Maduro, para 24.
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Court, before the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, implicitly, though only 
partly, recognised the Union’s duty to respect the national identity of 
the Member States, this being different from recognising national iden-
tity as a legitimate aim, in Commission v Luxembourg.93 Basically, it was 
only in cases involving deviations from the fundamental freedoms of the 
Member States justiﬁ ed by fundamental rights that the Court took into 
consideration speciﬁ c constitutional provisions as interpreted by the na-
tional courts.
The ﬁ rst important case in this group is the Omega case. There are 
three main points from this case important for the issues at hand. In 
this case, dealing with derogation from the freedom to provide services 
based on the public policy of the protection of human dignity as regu-
lated in the German Basic Law, (1) the ECJ held that the protection of 
fundamental rights constitutes a legitimate interest within the public 
policy of the Member States and justiﬁ es derogation from the fundamen-
tal freedoms of the EC. Restating on this point what had already been 
held by the ICC in Fragd,94 the ECJ declared that the legitimate interest 
pursued does not have to correspond to a conception shared by all Mem-
ber States. (2) The protection of fundamental rights as a public policy 
has to be interpreted strictly so that its scope cannot be determined 
unilaterally by each Member State without any control by Community 
institutions.95(3) Lastly, adding to the previous points, the ECJ held that 
such derogation from fundamental freedoms can be justiﬁ ed only if it 
passed the proportionality test. It is precisely in this last point that it 
relied heavily on the assessment of the Federal Administrative Court of 
Germany, which can be interpreted as recognition of the exclusive juris-
diction of national courts to decide the content of constitutional identity, 
in this case fundamental rights, and for it to review this interpretation 
in the light of EC/EU law. The same logic was followed in later case law. 
The Laval96 and Viking Line97 cases are very illustrative in this regard. 
93  Case 473/93 Commission v Luxembourg [1996] ECR I-3207.
94  Fragd (n 63) 657. 
95  Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermei-
sterin der Bundestadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609 para 30. This strict interpretation according 
to the court entails that ‘public policy may be relied on only if there is a genuine and suf-
ﬁ ciently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society’. See also para 31.
96  Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] ECR 
I-11767 paras 91-92.
97  Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation, Finish Seamen’s Union v 
Viking Line ABP, OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779 paras 85-90. Paragraph 85 reads 
‘it must be pointed out that, even if it is ultimately for the national court, which has sole 
jurisdiction to assess the facts and interpret the national legislation, to determine whether 
and to what extent such collective action meets those requirements, the Court of Justice, 
which is called on to provide answers of use to the national court, may provide guidance, 
based on the ﬁ le in the main proceedings and on the written and oral observations which 
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In the latter, the ECJ clearly set out the roles of both the national courts 
and ECJ. Thus, it can be concluded that basically the ECJ leaves it to 
national courts to determine the proportionality of national acts, while 
providing guidance for this discretion.98
The common denominator in this group of cases is that they all 
balance between the fundamental freedoms of the EU and fundamental 
rights as regulated in national constitutions. Due to this fact, one can-
not be too enthusiastic, as the ECJ has been following well-established 
practice, basically since the FCC Solange I decision, of respect for funda-
mental rights that are now also partly incorporated into the Treaties by 
the Charter on Fundamental Rights. Nevertheless, the degree of protec-
tion might turn out to be an issue, and at this point the national identity 
clause could play a role.
The crucial point of these cases is that the legal basis for allowing 
Members States to derogate from the application of EU law was found in 
provisions other than the national identity clause, namely Articles 39 and 
46 TEC, or better said the latter were not read in conjunction with Article 
6(3) TA. Maybe it seems that it does not really matter which of these pro-
visions are invoked, as the legal consequences are the same and EU law 
is not applied to the situation at hand. However, the difference between 
them is that whereas provisions regulating exceptions in the application 
of fundamental freedoms is totally within the jurisdiction of the ECJ, Ar-
ticle 4(2), as clariﬁ ed before, is not. Crucially, the latter provision ‘clearly 
refers back to the Member States’.99 It is not to be inferred from this view 
that the ECJ should invoke only the national identity clause. This would 
not be sound, as Article 6(3) was not to be applied and interpreted by the 
ECJ under Article 46 TEU but rather afﬁ rmed the duty that it has under 
treaty provisions to respect the fundamental constitutional structures 
of the Member States as declared in their constitutions and interpreted 
by their national constitutional courts. Since the new national identity 
clause has entered into force only recently, it might be true that the ECJ 
will adapt to the new meaning of this clause, even though certain recent 
developments do not give rise to an unreserved optimism.
In contrast to previous cases, in Michaniki,100 which involved the 
question of the (in)compatibility of a constitutional provision and an in-
ternal market directive, the ECJ did not follow the same approach, as the 
constitutional provision at stake was not of the same importance as the 
have been submitted to it, in order to enable the national court to give judgment in the 
particular case before it.’ 
98  See Groussot (n 66) 117.
99  FC Mayer, ‘Supremacy - Lost?’, Walter Hallstein-Institut, Paper 2/06, 8 <http://www.
whi-berlin.eu/documents/whi-paper0206.pdf> accessed 15 August 2012. 
100  Michaniki (n 56). 
287CYELP 8 [2012] 267-298
ones regulating fundamental rights.101 As a matter of fact, the Court did 
not pay any attention to the constitutional dimension of the case, and 
basically trivialised the meaning of the respective constitutional provi-
sion.102 However, is it up to this court to decide which constitutional 
provisions are trivial for EU law? This question implies that ‘a risky en-
terprise to project an EU ranking of values onto national constitutional 
law’103 which was not quite in line with Article 4(2) CTEU took place in 
this case.
AG Maduro was cautious104 in his opinion, which basically followed 
the reasoning of the Court in some of the previously mentioned cases. 
He drew attention to respect for national identity105 and the fact that this 
case involved a provision that had been subject to a prior national con-
stitutional assessment.106 He afﬁ rmed the national courts’ discretion to 
rule upon the meaning and scope of such provisions, subject to judicial 
review with regard to assessment of the proportionality of the speciﬁ c 
national provision.107 By taking this view, Maduro alluded to the sen-
sitivity of the issue and considerations that needed to be taken into ac-
count in the application of the proportionality test, even though, just like 
the ECJ itself, he did not really go into the Greek context, which raises 
concern for the appropriateness of the ﬁ nding.108
The ECJ, on the other hand, ignored most of these crucial points 
in its decision and applied the principle of the primacy of EU law, as 
articulated in International Handelsgesellschaft, by which it suggested 
the inconformity of the national constitutional provision with the spe-
ciﬁ c directive. The decision was not warmly welcomed and also received 
criticism because it was made at a particularly sensitive moment which 
could have arguably increased the gap between the ECJ and national 
constitutional courts in the context of the Lisbon decision of the FCC.109
Comparing Michaniki with Omega and other related cases, one 
can notice certain illuminating patterns. Namely, as far as fundamen-
tal rights are concerned, the ECJ seems to be rather ‘co-operative’ and 
101  Besselink (n 10) 48. 
102  V Kosta, Case Note ‘Case C-213/07, Michaniki AE v Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis, 
Ipourgos Epikratias’ (2009) 5 European Constitutional Law Review 510.
103  Besselink (n 10) 49.
104  Michaniki (n 56) Opinion of AG Maduro, opening remarks point 1: ‘What makes the 
present case unusual, however, is the fact that the national legislative measure in question 
is a constitutional provision. Should this fact affect the response to be given?’
105  Michaniki (n 56) Opinion of AG Maduro, para 31.
106  Michaniki (n 56) Opinion of AG Maduro, para 30.
107  Michaniki (n 56) Opinion of AG Maduro, paras 34-35.
108  Kosta (n 102) 512.
109  Kosta (n 102) 507.
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accepts and adheres to the discretion of national courts to determine 
the meaning, scope and importance of the speciﬁ c legitimate interest 
that is the fundamental constitutional right. However, as far as other 
constitutional provisions are concerned, the ECJ is not willing to be so 
resilient. Bearing in mind that constitutional identity not only includes 
fundamental rights but also certain other elements, it will be difﬁ cult for 
national constitutional courts and the ECJ to resolve issues related to 
respect for national identity. 
3.2.2 The case law in the post-Lisbon period
In the ﬁ rst years following the justiciability of the national identity 
clause, the ECJ has invoked this provision in only two cases. In the 
Sayn-Wittgenstein decision,110 the ECJ invoked Article 4(2) CTEU for the 
ﬁ rst time.111 This case involved a ban on the registration and use of noble 
titles, Austrian or foreign, in Austria as part of a person’s name, which 
was provided for by a statute (Abolition of the Nobility Act) of constitu-
tional rank implementing a constitutional principle of equal treatment, 
and the compatibility of this ban with the freedom of movement in the 
EU as regulated in Article 21 TFEU. Similar to some of the cases men-
tioned before, the ECJ decided that an encroachment on the freedom of 
movement under Article 21 through such a ban in a Member State can 
be justiﬁ ed and is proportional. The latter was determined by the ECJ it-
self, even though AG Sharpston stated that the national court should as-
sess proportionality112 on public policy grounds while invoking the duty 
for respect of the national identity of Member States only as a secondary 
argument.113 Here there are two points that need to be emphasised for 
the purpose of the position presented in this article.
First, the ECJ stated quite clearly that ‘national identity, may be 
taken into consideration when a balance is struck between legitimate in-
terest and the right of free movement of persons recognized under Eu-
ropean Union law’ (emphasis added),114 by means of which it inserted 
national identity within the framework of public policy justiﬁ cation and 
made this a free movement case.
Secondly, Article 4(2) CTEU was invoked in the context of the status 
of Austria as a republic115 in applying the proportionality test, which 
110  Case C 208/09 IIonka Sayn-Wittgeenstein v Landeshauptmann [2010] ECR I-13693.
111  For more on this case, see LFM Besselink, ‘Case C-208/09, Ilonka Sayn-Wittgen-
stein v Landeshauptmann von Wien, Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 22 De-
cember 2010’ (2012) 49(2) CML Rev 671-93.
112  Sayn-Wittgenstein (n 110) Opinion of AG Sharpston, para 68.
113  Von Bogdandy and Schill, (n 32) 1424.
114  Sayn-Wittgenstein, (n 110) para 83.
115  Sayn-Wittgenstein, (n 110) para 92 ‘It must also be noted ...’ (emphasis added).
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raises certain questions. Namely, while the whole case dealt with the 
equal treatment of citizens and its implementation through the ban on 
noble titles, the Republic’s status was not really at stake and could not 
be interpreted as an ‘obvious reason’ for the outcome of the case.116 The 
fact that a certain state is a republic does not necessarily mean that it 
must ban noble titles and interpret equal treatment in such a manner 
as Austria does. Thus, in this case a republican status is not really an 
argument for declaring the ban proportional. Additionally, the reason 
for such an outcome in this case can also be explained through the 
clear and explicit decision of the Constitutional Court of Austria upon 
the matter, declaring an act by the Austrian authorities different from 
the aforementioned ban as unconstitutional. Under such circumstances, 
any other outcome in this case would have put the ECJ on a line of direct 
confrontation with the Constitutional Court, something that it obviously 
tried to avoid by also invoking Article 4(2) CTEU. 
Bearing all this in mind, it could be easily claimed that the propor-
tionality test in essence was not applied in this case, similar to Omega,117 
which was referred to by the ECJ in this case. This leaves the national 
identity clause without particular meaning and purpose, thus making 
Article 4(2) CTEU very much redundant.118
In RuneviË-Vardyn,119 the ECJ dealt with an issue that involved the 
Lithuanian rules on the spelling of names on the birth and marriage 
certiﬁ cate of a couple: Mrs RuneviË-Vardyn, a Lithuanian citizen of Pol-
ish origin, and a Polish citizen, Mr Wardyn, who had got married in Lith-
uania, and the compliance of these rules with Article 21 TFEU. Of the 
three separate aspects120 that were recognised by the Court, only in the 
one that had to do with the discrepancy in the spelling of the surname 
of the husband on the marriage certiﬁ cates, Vardyn instead of Wardyn, 
was it declared that this could represent a restriction on the freedom of 
movement. Such a restriction could be justiﬁ ed by a national identity 
116  For a different view, see S Rodin, Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy (2011) 
30-31.
117  Sayn-Wittgenstein (n 110) para 86 ‘The Court has repeatedly noted that the concept of 
public policy as justiﬁ cation for a derogation from a fundamental freedom must be interpret-
ed strictly, so that its scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without 
any control by the European Union institutions …Thus, policy may be relied on only if there 
is a genuine and sufﬁ ciently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society’.
118  For an opposing view, see Besselink (n 111) 684-686.
119  Case-C 391/09 Malgožata RuneviË-Vardyn and Łukasz Pawel Wardyn v Vilniaus miesto 
savivaldybe
.
s administracija and Others [2011] OJ C 194 nyp. For more on this case, see 
H van Eijken, ‘Case-C 391/09, Malgožata RuneviË-Vardyn and Łukasz Pawel Wardyn v 
Vilniaus miesto savivaldybe
.
s administracija and Others Judgment of the Court (Second 
Chamber) of 12 May 2011’ (2012) 49(2) CML Rev 809-826.
120  RuneviË-Vardyn (n 119) para 51.
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concern, such as the protection of the Lithuanian language, which has 
a constitutional status conﬁ rmed by a decision of the Lithuanian consti-
tutional court, as pointed out by the ECJ.
The second case discussed in this part is important with respect to 
the issue at hand for two reasons. First, it is the second case in which 
the ECJ invoked the national identity clause. It was made clear in this 
case that national identity can be an independent justiﬁ cation for the 
derogation of a Member State from freedom of movement. However, the 
evocation of national identity grounds for justiﬁ cation for the ﬁ rst time 
within the framework of Article 4(2) CTEU is not related to fundamen-
tal rights but rather to the constitutional status of the Lithuanian lan-
guage.121 This might be a hint for a new development along the lines that 
were presented in the previous section related to fundamental rights as 
grounds for derogation from fundamental freedoms in the pre-Lisbon 
period. Additionally, Article 4(2) CTEU has been correlated with Article 
3(3) CTEU, which is an interesting aspect of the decision but which will 
not be dealt with further here.
Second, the Court in this context left it up to the national court to 
decide whether the spelling rules cause a serious inconvenience for the 
applicants and also on the proportionality between free movement and the 
right to private life under both Article 7 of the Charter and Article 8 of the 
ECHR on the one hand, and national identity on the other.122 This can be 
seen as a signiﬁ cant shift with regard to Sayn-Wittgenstein by providing the 
necessary leeway for national courts in deciding national identity issues. 
These two cases show that there is a positive development in recog-
nising the importance of the national identity clause, but it seems to 
be too early to draw speciﬁ c conclusions. Future cases will need to be 
followed closely in order to see if RuneviË-Vardyn will turn out to set a 
new standard or equilibrium in respect for the national identity of the 
Member States. 
4  The national identity clause and the absolute primacy of EU law: 
having your cake and eating it?
While discussing the questions in the previous section of who is to 
decide on national identity and determine the limit that it represents 
for EU law, it is evident that constitutional courts and the ECJ are not 
completely on the same page. Nothing else can be expected, because the 
answer to these questions might signiﬁ cantly impact the fundamental 
doctrine of the primacy of EU law.
121  RuneviË-Vardyn (n 119) paras 86-87.
122  RuneviË-Vardyn (n 119) para 91.
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Primacy is one of the cornerstones of EU law.123 Although it has no 
explicit treaty basis, despite several attempts, it was established and jus-
tiﬁ ed by the ECJ in its landmark decision Costa v ENEL on the basis of 
the independence, uniformity and efﬁ cacy of EC law.124 In Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft, the primacy was clariﬁ ed to also include the prece-
dence of EC law over national constitutions. This last point has been a 
bone of contention between national constitutional courts and the ECJ 
ever since.
While the primacy of EU law over national legislation has been ac-
cepted by national constitutional courts from the outset, the primacy 
of EU law over constitutions, or at least their fundamental provisions, 
has been continuously and persistently challenged.125 The arguments 
are basically founded on the source of authority of EU law in national 
legal systems and that is, in the view of these courts, the constitutions 
themselves. Therefore, they cannot agree to this type of emancipation 
of EU law, particularly not through a principle that has been developed 
by the ECJ and without a legal basis in the treaties. On the other hand, 
they consistently declare the openness of the national legal order and 
their commitment to EU law, since this is also an obligation stemming 
from constitutional provisions.
An interesting aspect of this development is the occurrence of what 
is referred to as the ‘duality’ of constitutional provisions. Namely, con-
stitutional courts have insisted on and emphasised the ‘core provisions’ 
whenever a matter related to EU law is placed before them. It could be 
implied that it is the red line they are not willing or able to cross even by 
invoking a European-friendly interpretation of these provisions, which in 
essence would mean their tacit amendment. Thus, phrases such as the 
‘material core’, ‘constitutional identity’, and ‘fundamental principles’ are 
a common feature of the reasoning of national constitutional courts in 
determining the limits of the application of EU law, which have now also 
found their clearer articulation in EU law through Article 4(2) CTEU. 
One can argue, judging by the attitude of constitutional courts and their 
interpretation of the national identity clause, pre- and post-Lisbon, that 
they see the national identity clause as the ‘weak spot’ of the primacy 
123  For more on primacy, see I Pernice, ‘Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal: Primacy of Euro-
pean Law’ in MP Maduro and L Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of EU Law: The Classics 
of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart 2010) 47; Chalmers, 
Davies and Monti (n 5) 203-210. On the difference between supremacy and primacy, see 
Mayer (n 99) 3-5.
124  Compare C Harlow, ‘Voices of Difference in a Plural Community’ (2002) 50 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 339, 358: ‘Supremacy is buttressed by the ingenious use made 
by the ECJ Judgment of the simple obligation imposed on Member States by EC Art 10 (ex 
5) “to take all appropriate measures” to fulﬁ l their Treaty obligations’.
125  The interpretation and consequences of Declaration No 17 are not discussed here.
292 Denis Preshova: Battleground or Meeting Point? Respect for National Identities...
of EU law.126 Perhaps a clear signal was sent by the FCC in the Lisbon 
decision by reserving, within the national legal order, the duty to deﬁ ne 
and protect constitutional identity and by avoiding the possibility of be-
ing circumvented by lower courts through preliminary references to the 
ECJ.127
The ECJ is not lagging behind and mirrors this position, particu-
larly through the insistence on the uniform and effective application of 
EU law. Not only are the instances in which it has invoked the national 
identity clause quite rare, but also the ECJ recently in September 2010 
afﬁ rmed its positions on the absolute primacy of EU law by referring to 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft.128 Additionally, the Kadi129 decision 
could prove to be a good argument for constitutional courts to argue 
the double standards applied by the ECJ with respect to the fundamen-
tal principles of EU law vis-a-vis the fundamental principles of national 
constitutions, and to challenge the understanding of the primacy of EU 
law,130 something that the FCC did not fail to notice and mention in its 
Lisbon decision.131 
Nonetheless, although the ECJ has started invoking Article 4(2) 
CTEU and to some extent abide by its duty, it is not certain that there 
will be no reaction from constitutional courts, especially if the interpre-
tation provided by the ECJ is not totally in line with the deﬁ ned meaning 
and scope of constitutional identity. In this sense, the reserved man-
date of constitutional courts to defend constitutional identity might lead 
these institutions to review the decisions of the ECJ, as it is also under 
the duty to respect national identity. True, it is not totally in line with 
the spirit and logic of EU law, according to which the ECJ should make 
the ultimate decision on the limits of EU law,132 but one cannot expect 
constitutional courts to rule contrary to their constitution when an in-
terpretation accommodating both EU and national law interests is not 
feasible.133
   
126  Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 5) 201.
127  FCC, Lisbon, (n 76) para 241; Ziller (n 79) 71.
128  Case C-409/06 Winner Wetten GmbH v Bürgermeisterin der Stadt Bergheim [2010] ECR 
I-8015 para 61. For more on the meaning of Winner Wetten in the context of Sayn-Wittgen-
stein, see Besselink (n 111) 689-691.
129  Joined Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council [2008] ECR 
I-6351.
130  For more on this point, see B De Witte, ‘European Union Law: How Autonomous is its 
Legal Order?’ (2010) 65 ZÖR 153.
131  FCC, Lisbon (n 76) para 340.
132  Mayer (n 99) 8.
133  Tomuschat (n 78) 279.
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The counter argument that it is practically a self-limitation of the 
primacy that is declared in the Treaty, and thus EU primary law, because 
of which absolute primacy is not affected, is not totally convincing.134 As 
stated above, constitutional courts will claim the last call on limits to the 
application of EU law on constitutional identity grounds. The claim will 
not be based, at least not solely, on Article 4(2) CTEU but rather on the 
respective constitutions that often declare that the principles, the parts 
relating to constitutional identity, are not to be amended by a regular 
constitutional procedure. By this very fact, it cannot be claimed that 
absolute primacy has not been impacted and that the ECJ should not 
adapt to it by paying due respect to national identities.
It should also be noted that constitutional courts have shown a cer-
tain level of self-restraint by declaring that this type of review of EU acts 
and actions will occur only under exceptional circumstances.135 Never-
theless, even if the chances of a conﬂ ict that could turn out to be unre-
solvable are very slim, such a possibility still exists and it could be just 
a matter of time before it occurs.136 The developments concerning the 
Data Retention Directive might prove to have such potential. Three con-
stitutional courts have declared that the domestic implementing acts are 
encroaching on constitutional rights and are thus unconstitutional. The 
FCC decision is particularly important as the ﬁ rst case in which ‘identity 
control’ was applied.137
Similar to the EAW case,138 the FCC chose an elegant solution to 
the issue, as it did not question the validity or applicability of the Direc-
tive but rather the German implementing legislation, and thus avoided 
preliminary reference to the ECJ. The conditions that were set by this 
court in order for an implementing act to be constitutional are very strict 
and for the most part hard to meet. As result, an infringement procedure 
against Germany has been initiated by the European Commission. Now 
it is up to the ECJ to decide whether this state has infringed its obliga-
134 M Kumm and VF Comella, ‘The Primacy Clause of the Constitutional Treaty and the 
Future of Constitutional Conﬂ ict in the European Union’ (2005) 3 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, 473, 479, 491-492.
135  Fragd (n 63) 657 ‘highly unlikely’; FCC, Lisbon (n 76) para 340 ‘exceptionally’; CCC (n 
71) paras 84, 110 and 139 ‘exceptional cases’. 
136  Interestingly, this was also noticed by the ICC as far back as 1989 in the Fragd case 
when it stated: ‘Such a conﬂ ict, whilst being highly unlikely, could still happen’. Fragd (n 
63) 657.
137  Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, 1BvR 256/08, 1BvR 263/08, 1 BvR 586/08 
of 2 March 2010 para 218, referring directly to the Lisbon decision: ‘It is part of the consti-
tutional identity of the Federal Republic of Germany that the citizens’ enjoyment of freedom 
may not be totally recorded and registered, and the Federal Republic must endeavour to 
preserve this in European and international connections’ (emphasis added). Translation 
taken from FCC Press release no 11/2010 of 2 March 2010.
138  FCC, European Arrest Warrant Act case, 2 BvR 2236/04 of 18 July 2005.
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tions in protecting its constitutional identity. If it decides against the 
Member State, which seems likely to happen, then it will be very inter-
esting to see the reaction of the FCC, if there is any of course.139
4.1 Constitutionalism beyond the state revisited 
The occurrence of such conﬂ icts, however, should not always be 
seen as something catastrophic. As matter of fact, many scholars who 
are proponents of the concept of constitutional pluralism take this as an 
acceptable, if not desirable, ‘risk’. Among the different views on consti-
tutional pluralism in the European Union, Mattias Kumm has directly 
included considerations of the national identity clause under the CT and 
its impact on the relationship between national and EU law, especially in 
the context of primacy, in developing his vision of constitutional plural-
ism.140 Within the framework of Constitutionalism Beyond the State (CBS) 
as a normative jurisprudential account of constitutional conﬂ icts devel-
oped by Kumm, it is claimed that the national identity clause authorises 
Member States to set aside EU law on constitutional identity grounds, 
and that it is something that under certain limited conditions,141 such 
as a clear and speciﬁ c constitutional rule,142 should be accepted by the 
ECJ. In arguing his position, Kumm further explains certain conditions 
for both national courts, ie constitutional ones, and the ECJ in making 
this type of constitutional conﬂ ict a moment of constructive deliberative 
engagement143 and transforming the role of constitutional courts into 
one of ‘a constructive corrective force’144 in the European Union. The un-
derlying principle of best ﬁ t as opposed to the ultimate legal rule premise 
is aimed at leading national courts to rely on both national and Euro-
pean Union law.145 Thus, in the case of conﬂ ict, claims should not be 
made as to which legal order will have primacy, but it should be an act of 
balancing between competing principles in a way that will best suit the 
common values underlying both legal orders and practices. 
139  To make the issue even more interesting, the Commission in its evaluation report on the 
Directive wrote: ‘the Commission intends to propose amendments to the Directive, based 
on an impact assessment.’ Commission, Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive 
(Directive 2006/24/EC) COM (2011) 225 ﬁ nal 1. The question is thus if the Commission 
will consider the requirements of the FCC and if it will be willing to meet them.
140  For more on this, see M Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conﬂ ict: Con-
stitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 11(3) 
European Law Journal 262-307.
141  Kumm (n 140) 302-304.
142  Kumm (n 140) 297-298; Kumm and Comella (n 134) 488-489.
143  Kumm (n 140) 269.
144  Kumm (n 140) 292.
145  Kumm (n 140) 282-288. 
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Under these circumstances, not only will Pandora’s Box146 remain 
closed, but also through the engagement of national constitutional 
courts a relationship of complementarity between the courts in achiev-
ing a common constitutional tradition in Europe and furthering Euro-
pean integration will be fostered. Chaos has neither come about and nor 
is it on the verge of happening; on the contrary.147 
As has been shown, the national constitutional courts have them-
selves declared quite openly that a constitutional conﬂ ict might occur 
in only very exceptional circumstances, as has been the case so far. 
In this sense, even the recent case law, especially the cases analysed 
above where the courts referred to EU law and Article 4(2) CTEU in their 
reasoning, conﬁ rms the positions of CBS and makes the case for this 
pluralistic vision even stronger after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. 
On the other hand, also following the line of argumentation in CBS, it is 
for the ECJ to take further steps in a direction that would provide more 
leeway for national courts to assess whether national, ie constitutional, 
identity has been touched upon. Such an involvement and engagement 
of the constitutional courts will only further pacify relations through the 
perception of the constitutional courts as equal partners and contribu-
tors to the creation of a common constitutional area in Europe.
Recent developments in the case law of the ECJ provide evidence 
that the Court is starting to take this issue more seriously, even though 
one should not jump to conclusions, as this has happened only recent-
ly in RuneviË-Vardyn. In any case, the last line of defence for the ECJ 
against compromising the uniform and effective application of EU law 
will be Article 2 CTEU. As an addition to CBS, this interpretation is also 
in line with the legislative history and original meaning of this provision 
within the framework of the CT.148 At the same time, this leading value 
of EU law does not need to be taken to the extreme, as it might be stated 
that it could be overridden by other values and principles as well as the 
fact that now throughout the Union EU law is not applied in this strict 
sense bearing in mind all the exceptions, opt-outs or protocols excluding 
certain Member States from respect for this principle. 
4.2 Content v normative relevance 
Authors writing on this topic have put forward the argument that 
the national identity clause as a matter of EU law is to be applied and 
interpreted solely by the ECJ, as this is the court that provides the au-
146  M Wendel, ‘Lisbon before the Courts: Comparative Perspectives’ (2011) 7 European 
Constitutional Law, 96, 135.
147  See the part on the Cassandra and Pangloss scenarios in Kumm (n 140) 291-292.
148  CONV 375/1/02 REV 1, 11. 
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thoritative interpretation of EU law. In claiming this, however, the argu-
ment goes on to explain that basically Article 4(2) CTEU incorporates 
two dimensions. The ﬁ rst one is the content and scope of the constitu-
tional identity that needs to be determined by the respective national 
courts, above all constitutional courts, because it is a matter of national 
law. The second is the normative relevance of this provision with regard 
to the limits that it sets on the application of EU law, which must be de-
termined by the ECJ.149
Even though at ﬁ rst glance this argument is well founded, it mani-
fests a certain weakness and shortcoming in its elaboration. Namely, the 
differentiation between the content and scope of the respective consti-
tutional identity and its normative relevance in EU law is not always an 
easy and simple task. This is particularly the case when there is no clear 
declaration by a respective national authority or constitutional court on 
this point, which some authors overlook.150 As noted before, constitu-
tional courts have not been so keen on listing the values and principles 
of constitutional identity and thus retained their right to decide upon 
it only in speciﬁ c cases. Under such circumstances and in the absence 
of procedural instruments such as a preliminary reference to constitu-
tional courts, the ECJ in deciding a case involving a claim of respect 
for national identity employing the proportionality test will enter into a 
forbidden zone of determining the content and scope of the constitutional 
identity of a Member State.151 This is in essence contrary to Article 19 
CTEU and also contrary to its duty to respect Article 4(2) CTEU.
If a government or national court makes a claim for respect for na-
tional identity in a case before the ECJ, then the ECJ needs to leave the 
determination of constitutional identity and the proportionality test to 
the national courts by providing certain guidelines, even in cases where 
the constitutional court has not voiced itself on the issue. In this way, the 
ECJ will avoid deciding on essential and non-essential elements of na-
tional constitutions152 or adapting the reasoning on constitutional iden-
tity based on primary or secondary EU law.153
149  Wendel (n 146) 134-135; von Bogdandy and Schill (n 32) 1448.
150  Von Bogdandy and Schill (n 32) 1449.
151  Case C 51/08 European Commission v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg [2011] OJ C 204 
nyp, para 124. See Besselink (n 111) 687. 
152  Rodin (n 116) 26.
153  Von Bogdandy and Schill (n 32), 1441-1445; Besselink (n 111) 688. Besselink is not 
that convincing when making the argument that secondary EU law can rarely imply a con-
stitutional identity issue. The counter-argument would be the Data-Retention Directive, 
which has drawn signiﬁ cant attention especially with the interpretations of the right to 
privacy and other related fundamental rights.
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In the two post-Lisbon decisions of the ECJ, however, constitutional 
courts have had their say on the speciﬁ c aspect of constitutional identity, 
but the ECJ, although deferential to national courts, was not consistent 
in its approach. Unlike in RuneviË-Vardyn, where it left the proportional-
ity test to national courts, in Sayn-Wittgenstein the ECJ tried to translate 
the case into an exclusively freedom of movement case. Nevertheless, in 
the application of the proportionality test it relied only on national law 
arguments, such as the constitutional nature of the provision of equality 
of treatment and the abolition of noble titles, the ruling of the Austrian 
Constitutional Court and Austria’s status as a republic as part of its 
constitutional identity, which could easily lead to a claim that effectively 
no proportionality test was applied or that it was just a ‘thin’ proportion-
ality test.154 It is important to closely follow future decisions of the ECJ 
involving respect for constitutional identity, particularly bearing in mind 
another string of case law in which the latest episode was Winner-Wetten, 
which might put under suspicion the readiness of the ECJ to adapt the 
absolute primacy of EU law.155
All things considered, there are no strict guarantees that courts 
will abide by their duties under EU law or national constitutional law, 
especially with respect to constitutional identity. This situation shows 
that Article 4(2) CTEU will probably not be able to solve the riddle of 
absolute primacy. The complexity of the whole issue is such that the na-
tional identity clause does not sufﬁ ce and cannot be a panacea.156 As a 
matter of fact, there is also doubt whether the highest courts of the two 
legal orders have the instruments required to bring this conundrum to 
an end.157 There are inherent limitations, both procedural and material, 
in these instances. If the two positions, the one of the ECJ and that 
of the national constitutional courts, cannot be reconciled under such 
circumstances, then perhaps the solution should be sought in political 
institutions and political decisions.158 The available options159 might in-
clude changes to the law, treaties or constitutions, or opting for an Irish 
solution, ie enacting a protocol declaring the limit of EU law application 
on matters of high constitutional importance.160 Even though these al-
154  Besselink (n 111) 689.
155  Besselink (n 111).
156  On the shortcomings of pluralist theories, see Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 5) 199. 
See also Mayer (n 60) 311.
157  See Fragd (n 63) 659, ‘balancing between uniform application or certainty of law and 
the fundamental principles of national constitutions will represent an extremely difﬁ cult 
evaluation’. 
158  Kumm (n 140) 274; Kumm and Comella (n 134) 490.
159  Mayer (n 60) 311; Compare Mayer (n 99) 8.
160  Compare Mayer (n 99) 7.
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ternatives are difﬁ cult to achieve, it is to be seen whether they are more 
viable than withdrawal from the Union.161
5 Conclusion
Slowly but surely, respect for national identity is becoming a catch-
phrase of both EU and national constitutional law. Article 4(2) CTEU has 
drawn signiﬁ cant attention in judicial but also academic discourse. Na-
tional constitutional courts perceive it as a conﬁ rmation at the EU level 
of their consistent views on the relationship between national constitu-
tional law and EU law and as the soft spot of the primacy of EU law. The 
ECJ interprets this provision as just another justiﬁ cation that may be 
taken into consideration when balancing national measures with funda-
mental freedoms, avoiding truly adapting the rigid interpretation of the 
absolute primacy of EU law.
The view taken here is that Article 4(2) CTEU creates a basis at the 
EU level for the recognition of the right of national constitutional courts 
to set aside EU law under exceptional circumstances when a value or 
principle of their constitutional identity is encroached upon. This right is 
not an absolute one, however, and it will be up to the ECJ to defend the 
outer limits of EU law through Article 2 CTEU. 
Such a view is based on the concept of constitutional pluralism, 
particularly the constitutionalism beyond the state account of Mattias 
Kumm. It seems that the case for CBS is even stronger in the aftermath 
of the Lisbon Treaty, which can vividly be seen through the attitude of 
national constitutional courts, but which is also supported by textual 
and contextual analysis of this provision. The ECJ has hinted lately in 
its RuneviË-Vardyn decision that there might be a shift in its practice, but 
it is still too early to say.
In this way, the signiﬁ cance of Article 4(2) CTEU should not be over-
stated. The national identity clause will not be able to solve the core 
problem of the relationship between the two legal orders that are the 
source of the authority of EU law, and based on this the primacy of EU 
law. Nevertheless, it should not be underestimated, as it surely provides 
the conditions for increased co-operation among the highest judicial in-
stances in Europe. Thus, it will not be a battleground but will mitigate 
any future conﬂ ict by providing a framework for damage control. Neither 
will it be a total meeting point, as the circumstances in the relationship 
are a bit too complex for one provision to be able to abolish any type of 
friction. 
161  Mayer (n 99) 8.
